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ABSTRACT. The fourth and final volume of The History of Sexuality offers the keystone to Michel 
Foucault’s critique of Western neoliberal societies. Confessions of the Flesh provides the heretofore 
missing link that ties Foucault’s late writings on subjectivity to his earlier critique of power. Fou-
cault identifies in Augustine’s treatment of marital sexual relations the moment of birth of the 
modern legal actor and of the legalization of social relations. With the appearance of the modern 
legal subject, Foucault’s critique of modern Western societies is complete: it is now possible to see 
how the later emergence of an all-knowing homo œconomicus strips the State of knowledge and thus 
deals a fatal blow to its legitimacy. The appearance of both the modern legal actor and homo œco-
nomicus makes it possible to fold the entire four-volume History of Sexuality back into Foucault’s 
earlier critique of punitive and biopolitical power. And it now challenges us to interrogate how 
we, contemporary subjects, are shaped in such a way as to implicate ourselves—both willingly 
and unwittingly—in the social order within which we find ourselves and that, through the inter-
action of knowledge-power-subjectivity, we reproduce.  
Keywords: Augustine, consent, legalization, modern legal subject, homo œconomicus, critique of 
neoliberalism. 
In the final pages of the now-final volume of The History of Sexuality, Volume 4: Les Aveux 
de la chair (Confessions of the Flesh), Foucault’s intellectual project achieves its long-awaited 
completion. In those final pages, dedicated to Augustine’s writings on marital sexual re-
lations, Foucault reveals the heretofore missing link that now binds his four-volume his-
tory of sexuality to his critique of Western forms of governing. Foucault discovers in Au-
gustine the birth of the modern legal actor and legalization of social relations. Foucault 
identifies the moment when, in Western Christian societies, the mechanisms of social or-
dering gave rise to what Foucault calls “the subject of law” (« le sujet de droit »): the modern 
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rights-bearing and responsible individual inscribed in a legal framework of accountabil-
ity, responsibility, and autonomy.  
Like the final piece of a jigsaw puzzle, the appearance of the modern legal actor com-
pletes Foucault’s overarching critical project. With Confessions of the Flesh, the genetic 
make-up of the modern legal subject is decoded. It is now possible to fold the four-volume 
series of The History of Sexuality back into Foucault’s critique of power and neoliberal gov-
ernance, from whence it originated.  
With that missing piece now firmly in place in a book that was intended to be pub-
lished—and it is of the utmost importance to distinguish his published monographs, all 
ten of them now, from his other productions, whether lectures, conferences, essays, or 
interviews—it is finally possible to fully articulate Foucault’s critique of contemporary 
neoliberal forms of governing in the full three-dimensionality that Foucault had prom-
ised—the three-dimensionality of savoir-pouvoir-sujet, of knowledge, power, and subjec-
tivity (or, as others had proposed earlier, of epistemology, politics, and ethics). 
Foucault’s critique of Western societies, specifically the neoliberal forms of governance 
at the turn of the 1980s, can now be articulated and summarized as follows:  
The modern legal subject—le sujet de droit—begins to appear with Augustine’s writings 
on consent, will, responsibility, accountability, and autonomy in the context of marital 
sexual relations in works such as De bono conjugali and De nuptiis et concupiscentia. The 
legal actor who emerges in Augustine’s writings flourishes in the modern political theo-
ries of sovereignty of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (which are often discussed 
under the rubric of “reason of state” or raison d’État). The modern legal subject ends up 
placing certain limits on sovereign power and gives rise to the ideas of checks and bal-
ances, of divided power, of limits on governing, and ultimately, to the paradigm of mid-
twentieth-century liberal democracy.  
As against that model of liberal democratic governance, there emerges a competing 
figure of homo œconomicus, with origins in Locke and the writings of the Physiocrats and 
liberal economists of the eighteenth century, but then in more concentrated form in the 
theories of neoliberal economists after World War II. As the experience, practices, and 
subjectivity of homo œconomicus begin to supplant that of the modern legal actor, the eco-
nomic subject gradually delegitimizes and deposes the state in a far more sweeping way. 
It strips the state of all possible knowledge, rendering government entirely impotent: only 
the neoliberal subject can know his own interests; the government and the collectivity, by 
contrast, have no access and no way to know anyone’s best interests. As a result, the state 
and collectivity are stripped of knowledge; they are ignorant and helpless. Whereas the 
modern legal subject only placed limits on the state, homo œconomicus now divests the state 
and collectivity of all knowledge and legitimacy, thereby doing away with the need for 
government entirely. 
But—and this is the locus of Foucault’s critique—the premise that homo œconomicus 
knows his self-interest best, and that the government and collectivity are ignorant on this 
score, is itself simply an assumption and a bald assertion. It is an unfounded belief, a mere 
assertion of truth. Yet it is baked into the theory of neoclassical economics, from François 
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Quesnay and Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek and Gary Becker. As a result, the entire 
framework of neoliberalism rests on an illusion, a sleight of hand: all of the theories, prac-
tices, institutions, and structures of neoliberal governance are themselves baked into the 
initial imagination of an all-knowing homo œconomicus. 
Confessions of the Flesh provides the missing piece to Foucault’s critique by locating, in 
Augustine’s writings on consent and responsibility in marital sexual relations, the key 
transformation from the subject of lust of early Christian thought to the modern legal sub-
ject who limits state sovereignty. As Foucault writes, “Consent – and this is the reason for 
the central role it plays in Augustine and will play later – makes it possible to designate 
the subject of concupiscence as a subject of law.”1 The appearance of the modern legal 
subject in Augustine’s theoretical framework is what makes possible the ensuing trans-
formation of the subject of law into the homo œconomicus of neoclassical economic and 
neoliberal thought—the form of subjectivity that then radically strips the government and 
collectivity of all knowledge and legitimacy.  
As Foucault emphasized in 1979 in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics, in order to 
understand the contemporary moment, the neoliberal economic subject had to be distin-
guished from the modern legal actor. The distinction was key: “homo œconomicus et sujet 
de droit n’étaient donc pas superposables,”2 Foucault emphasized. “In the eighteenth cen-
tury,” Foucault lectured, “the figure of homo œconomicus and the figure of what we would 
call homo juridicus or homo legalis are absolutely heterogeneous and cannot be superim-
posed on each other.”3 But in order to understand and analyze homo œconomicus, Foucault 
had to trace the transformation of subjectivity—what he called “the history of desiring 
man,” what we might rename “the history of the desiring subject”—from ancient Greece, 
through the Greco-Roman philosophers and practices of the first centuries, to the patristic 
period and Augustine, in order to discover the birth and genetic make-up of the modern 
legal subject. Confessions of the Flesh, in this sense, lays the final stone, the keystone, to the 
full edifice of Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism.  
When Foucault originally began his examination of biopolitical forms of power in the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality in 1976, he was openly dissatisfied with the explan-
atory force of disciplinary power, which he had set forth a year earlier in his magnum 
opus Discipline and Punish. Neither the model of political sovereignty, which Foucault 
neatly encapsulated in the formulation “to take life or let live,” nor the paradigm of sur-
veillance, discipline, and the punitive society, seemed fully adequate to the task of critiqu-
ing the emerging softer forms of social governance and management associated with the 
budding neoliberalism of the 1970s—reflected in the election in France of President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing in 1974. Foucault sketched in Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, The 
Will to Know, the contours of a new model of power: the biopolitical form of power. Fou-
cault famously reversed that earlier formulation to read “to make live or let die” and fo-
cused now on the management of populations, rather than the discipline of individuals. 
 
1 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality vol. 4, Confessions of the Flesh (2021), 280. 
2 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 1978-1979 (2004), 295.  
3 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (2008), 276. 
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At that time in 1976, Foucault outlined how his analysis would proceed, listing on the 
back cover the five volumes that would appear next: La chair et le corps; La croisade des 
enfants; La femme, la mère et l’hystérique; Les pervers; and Population et races.4 Those five books 
were intended to trace how the experience of what was called “sexuality” since the nine-
teenth century came into being and how it shaped the modern subject.5  
The aim, all along, was to explore the regulation of sexual relations—one of the richest 
domains of moralization in human history6—in order to understand better and critique 
“modern Western societies,” in Foucault’s words.7 In other words, the goal all along was 
to seize better the form of power relations that Foucault would christen biopolitical power. 
But this, Foucault realized, first required a better understanding of liberalism and neolib-
eralism. Foucault explained this clearly to his audience at the Collège de France on Janu-
ary 10, 1979, in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics. As he indicated, he had intended to 
focus those lectures on the core question of biopolitics but needed first to better under-
stand the modern legal subject and the emergence of neoliberalism: 
I thought I could do a course on biopolitics this year, but it seems to me that the analysis 
of biopolitics can only get under way when we have understood the general regime of 
this governmental reason I have talked about […] Consequently, it seems to me that it 
is only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of liberalism opposed to 
raison d’État … only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism 
was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.8 
A couple of months later, Foucault gave the title On the Government of the Living for the 
following year’s Collège de France lectures, reflecting his intention to continue the work 
on biopolitics as a form of governing.9 However, just as his lectures on The Birth of Biopol-
itics did not return directly to biopolitics but focused instead on neoliberal discourse in 
France, the history of Ordoliberalism in Germany, and American neoliberal thought, Fou-
cault’s lectures On the Government of the Living did not centrally engage biopolitics but 
instead went further back in history to an earlier archive—namely Sophocles, the Stoics, 
 
4 Draft manuscript versions of the first two are now in the Fonds Foucault at the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France. See “Foreword” of Frédéric Gros, Confessions of the Flesh, vii.  
5 The concept of “experience” is central to Foucault’s project and, as Henri-Paul Fruchaud has highlighted, 
traces back to Foucault’s work on Binswanger. As Fruchaud reminds us, Foucault wrote, in a draft “Preface” 
originally destined for the English translation of The Use of Pleasures, that his thoughts on experience related 
back to his work on Binswanger. This important reference will be discussed in the critical apparatus of the 
forthcoming publication of Foucault’s manuscript on Binswanger, which was written shortly after his Intro-
duction to Binswanger’s Rêve et existence, published in 1954. See forthcoming volume in Cours et travaux avant 
le Collège de France, Binswanger et l’analyse existentielle, edited by Elisabetta Basso, due out in May 2021. 
6 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (1990), 10.  
7 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2. L’usage des plaisirs (1984), 10; Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 3-4 (“My 
aim was […] to analyze the theoretical and practical context with which it [that quite recent and banal notion 
of ‘sexuality’] has been associated. In short, it was a matter of seeing how an ‘experience’ came to be consti-
tuted in modern Western societies…”).  
8 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 21-22. 
9 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980 (2014), Course 
Context, 327. 
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and the early Christian pastoral—in order to reexamine the genealogy of our contempo-
rary neoliberal forms of rationality. 
Surprisingly, Foucault had eschewed the ancients as a source of governmental reason-
ing two years earlier. On February 8, 1978, in his lectures Security, Territory, Population, 
after discussing Œdipus Rex, Foucault observed that: “I do not think that the idea that one 
could govern men, or that one did govern men, was a Greek idea. If I have the time and 
courage I will come back to this problem, either at the end of these lectures or in the next 
series of lectures…”10 But by 1980, Foucault had decidedly changed his mind. And pre-
cisely where Foucault left off in 1978 is where he picks up in the 1980 lectures On the 
Government of the Living. On his return to these texts in 1980—specifically to Œdipus Rex 
and the early Greco-Roman philosophers—Foucault locates the origins of a genealogy of 
the modern subject. The 1980 lectures represent both a corrective, in which he casts doubt 
on his earlier statement about Greek antiquity, and a return to the search for our modern 
governmentality. 
As he drafted La chair et le corps—the intended second volume to The History of Sexuality 
on Christian conceptions of sexual relations after the Lateran Council, the volume that 
would have been closest to Confessions of the Flesh11—Foucault refined his theory of subject 
creation and reached further back in history. He did so publicly in the first four lectures 
of On the Government of the Living at the Collège de France, reinterpreting Œdipus Rex 
through the lens of truth-telling and the manifestation of self, and he provided, in effect, 
a curative to his earlier claim about the lack of any art of governing in ancient Greece. This 
launched his investigation into the pre-Christian East and moved the genealogy of the 
modern subject back, opening new vistas and reorienting the project from the couple 
knowledge-power to the trinity knowledge-power-subject. The reorientation led Foucault 
to study the avowal, the examination of conscience, the direction of others, forms of truth-
telling—in sum, the work on subjectivity and subject creation that would first come to-
gether in his lectures at Louvain in 1981, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of 
Avowal in Justice, and later produced the second, third, and now fourth and final published 
volumes of The History of Sexuality.12 
Confessions of the Flesh thus provides the missing jigsaw piece in the now fully-pub-
lished book series: the emergence of the modern legal subject. This completes Foucault’s 
overall argument and does so, as I mentioned earlier, in the full three-dimensionality of 
knowledge-power-subjectivity to which Foucault aspired. Foucault did not, however, 
have the time, given his illness, to reframe Volume 4 after he had published Volumes 2 
 
10 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78 (2007), 123. It is at 
this point in 1978 that Foucault turns to the pre-Christian East, spiritual direction, and the pastoral.  
11 See “Foreword” of Frédéric Gros, Confessions of the Flesh, viii-ix. 
12 Interestingly, the step-wise sequence of his return to ancient Greece is reflected as well in the drafting of 
the three final volumes of The History of Sexuality: Foucault began with Volume 4 on the patristic thinkers, 
writing it sometime between 1980 and 1982, and put it aside after having sent the manuscript to Gallimard 
in the Fall of 1982; he then proceeded to draft Volumes 2 and 3 (which were intended to be one volume on 
the ancients) and published them in April and May 1984, shortly before his untimely death in June of that 
year. 
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and 3. Precisely for this reason, the publication of Confessions of the Flesh in its present 
unfinished condition presents the reader with the opportunity to complete the task that 
Foucault had left incomplete: namely, to reintegrate the work on subjectivity back into the 
overarching framework of knowledge-power-subject. That was the task that was cut short by 
Foucault’s untimely death; however, the fourth volume of The History of Sexuality offers a 
blueprint of how to complete that final task: it reveals how to fold back the study of subject 
creation and subjectification into the knowledge-power-subject framework.  
I strongly suspect that Foucault would have performed this integrative work in the 
process of editing the manuscript of Les Aveux de la chair for final publication.13 I believe 
this integrative work would have formed the crux of a conclusion to the volume, which is 
clearly missing, at least on my reading.14 Foucault did not have the opportunity, because 
of his untimely death. What we are reading is the manuscript draft that reflects his think-
ing in about 1980-82, at the time that he returned to the Ancients.15 But with the appear-
ance of the modern legal subject at the tail end of Volume 4, I trust Foucault would have 
done the work of folding his history of the desiring subject into his critique of power in 
modern Western societies. The publication of the volume in 2018, thirty-four years later, 
reveals the path forward—and in that alone, it is a remarkable contribution to contempo-
rary critical thought.  
Many readers of Foucault have complained that the turn to subjectivity, to care of the 
self, and to truth-telling at the end of Foucault’s intellectual journey undermines the po-
litical force of his philosophy and has pushed contemporary critical thought into a com-
placent apolitical direction. Ella Myers argues, for instance, in her book, Worldly Ethics: 
Democratic Politics and Care for the World (Duke 2013),16 that Foucault’s turn in the early 
1980s away from the study of power and toward the practices of the self is ultimately 
 
13 I should emphasize this is a speculative claim. I make it on the basis of Foucault’s full theoretical and 
intellectual trajectory, and not on any written indications or reports from his contemporaneous friends and 
associates, or from Daniel Defert’s chronology. The existence and placement of the material published as 
Appendix 2 at pages 291-314 of Confessions of the Flesh provides some corroborating evidence for this specu-
lation, although my argument does not rest in any way on those materials but on the broader arc of Foucault’s 
work. Those materials in Appendix 2 include developments that Foucault expressly made in his lectures on 
governmentality in his Tanner lectures and in Security, Territory, Population—precisely the moment of inte-
gration that I am proposing; and those materials from Appendix 2 were located in a folder physically located 
at the end of the first part of the manuscript of Les Aveux de la chair. See “Foreword” of Frédéric Gros, Con-
fessions of the flesh, xii-xiii; Stuart Elden, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh,” Theory, Culture & Society 
March 20 (2018) (discussing Appendix 2 and how it “shows ever more clearly how the projects on govern-
mentality and sexuality were mutually constitutive”). So there is corroborating evidence; but again, my ar-
gument here rests on the broader theoretical and structural aspects of Foucault’s critical intellectual journey.  
14 See also Sverre Raffnsøe, “Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh. The fourth volume of The History of Sexuality,” 
Foucault Studies, No. 25 (October 2018), 415 (noting that “the volume ends rather abruptly”). Although the 
Introduction to Volume 2 may have served as an introduction to Volume 4, as it did to Volume 3, I neverthe-
less feel that Les Aveux de la chair starts abruptly and that there may have been an opportunity, in a preface 
or introduction, for Foucault to perform some of the integrative work I am suggesting.  
15 See “Foreword” of Frédéric Gros, Confessions of the flesh, xi; Sverre Raffnsøe, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions 
of the Flesh,” Foucault Studies, No. 25 (October 2018), 395-396 (describing and dating this to 1976).  
16 Ella Myers, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World (2013). 
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depoliticizing and undemocratic. Some scholars go even further and argue that Foucault 
himself actually favored neoliberalism.  
Confessions of the Flesh should dispel those complaints and misreading, and open the 
way to integrate Foucault’s projects on knowledge-power and subjectivity. As Foucault 
underscored in the section titled “Modifications” in the introduction to The Use of Pleasures 
(Volume 2) when he resumed publication of The History of Sexuality in 1984—one of the 
single-most important passages in Foucault’s writings post Discipline and Punish—the turn 
to subjectivity in Volumes 2, 3, and now 4, had to be understood as a complement to the 
critique of power. Foucault’s critical project, as he emphasized in “Modifications,” was 
three-dimensional and involved, in his own words, first “the formation of sciences (sa-
voirs),” second “the systems of power,” and third “the forms within which individuals are 
able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects.”17 Foucault observed that his previ-
ous research on the archaeology of knowledge and the genealogy of power served well to 
study the first two dimensions,18 but that he fell behind in elaborating the third dimension, 
namely subjectivity.19 And whereas the study of knowledge had required a first shift in 
the critical method toward archeology, and the study of power had required a second 
shift in the critical method toward genealogy, to get at the third dimension of his project 
Foucault needed to make another shift in his approach to study the history of the desiring 
subject.20 The reason being that we intuitively tend to take desire as static, constant, essen-
tial, atemporal, almost universal—as if subjects have always had the same sexual desire—
whereas, as Foucault argued, desire must be studied genealogically, a task that he de-
scribed as both historical and critical, ”un travail historique et critique.”21 The critical 
 
17 The Use of Pleasure, 4 (“To speak of ‘sexuality’ as a historically singular experience also presupposed the 
availability of tools capable of analyzing the peculiar characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that 
constitute it: (1) the formation of sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its 
practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of 
this sexuality.”) 
18 The Use of Pleasure, 5 (“Now, as to the first two points, the work I had undertaken previously—having to 
do first with medicine and psychiatry, and then with punitive power and disciplinary practices—provided 
me with the tools I needed. The analysis of discursive practices made it possible to trace the formation of 
disciplines (savoirs) while escaping the dilemma of science versus ideology. And the analysis of power rela-
tions and their technologies made it possible to view them as open strategies, while escaping the alternative 
of a power conceived of as domination or exposed as a simulacrum.”) 
19 The Use of Pleasure, 5-6 (“But when I came to study the modes according to which individuals are given to 
recognize themselves as sexual subjects, the problems were much greater. […] Thus, in order to understand 
how the modern individual could experience himself as a subject of a “sexuality,” it was essential first to 
determine how, for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize himself as a subject of desire.”) 
20 The Use of Pleasure, 6 (“It appeared that I now had to undertake a third shift, in order to analyze what is 
termed “the subject.” It seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by 
which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject. After first studying the games of truth 
(jeux de vérité) in their interplay with one another, as exemplified by certain empirical sciences in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, and then studying their interaction with power relations, as exemplified by 
punitive practices—I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the 
forming of oneself as a subject, taking as my domain of reference and field of investigation what might be 
called “the history of desiring man.”) 
21 Foucault, L’usage des plaisirs, 12. 
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dimension is key: It is the critical historical study of the subject of desire that would call 
for “toute l’étude autour de la lente formation, pendant l’antiquité, d’une herméneutique de soi.”22 
It would be an impoverished reading of Confessions of the Flesh—or, for that matter, of 
the other two volumes from 1984, or his Collège de France lectures after 1980—to view 
Foucault’s work on subjectivity as displacing his earlier problematization of knowledge-
power. It does not “scrap” nor “defer his analysis of modern society” but rather completes 
it.23 It does not represent a break from the earlier critical intervention but rather a fulfill-
ment of it. It adds a necessary dimension.  
Foucault expressly stated, in his last lectures in 1984, The Courage of Truth, that it would 
be an impoverished reading of his theory of knowledge-power to set aside the subject: “to 
depict this kind of research as an attempt to reduce knowledge (savoir) to power, to make 
it the mask of power in structures, where there is no place for a subject, is purely and 
simply a caricature.”24 Foucault did not need to state the inverse at that moment, but it is 
fully implicit in what he said: It would be an impoverished reading of Foucault’s work on 
subjectivity not to integrate it back into the critique of knowledge and power. In this sense, 
it is essential to read Volumes 2, 3, and now 4 back into Volume 1. It is crucial now to 
integrate all three dimensions of Foucault’s thought — knowledge-power-subject — in 
order to understand his full critique of modern forms of governance.25  
With the birth of the modern legal subject in Confessions of the Flesh, it is now possible 
to do precisely that. It is possible to integrate the full History of Sexuality back into his 
critique of modern Western societies. As I have suggested, I believe that is what Foucault 
would have done in a revised introduction and conclusion to the fourth and final volume 
of this series—but was cut off by his illness. That is our greatest task and challenge today: 
to explore how we have been shaped as subjects in such a way as to implicate ourselves—
both willingly and unwittingly—in the social order within which we find ourselves and 
that, through the interaction of knowledge-power-subjectivity, we reproduce and 
 
22 Ibid., 13. 
23 Joseph Tanke, “The Final ‘Final Foucault’?” Los Angeles Review of Books, August 1 (2018). Tanke’s essay on 
Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh is brilliant and insightful, but in this one respect, I disagree—especially 
where he writes that “As a result, the emergence of this ethical axis compelled Foucault to scrap, or at least 
to defer, his analysis of modern society in terms of ‘bio-power’—his designation for the configuration of 
power and knowledge responsible for managing human life by treating individuals as members of a popu-
lation, subjecting them to probabilistic calculations regarding health, sanitation, life-expectancy, birthrate, 
and race—in order to undertake a genealogy of ‘desiring man.’”  
24 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1938-1984 (2011), 10.  
25 As Stuart Elden emphasizes, “the projects on governmentality and sexuality were mutually constitutive.” 
Stuart Elden, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh,” Theory, Culture & Society 20 (2018). Daniele Lo-
renzini contributes importantly to the task of repoliticizing Foucault’s final lectures and volumes of The His-
tory of Sexuality by interpreting them as constituting “a political history of the will” and as contributing to 
Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism. See Daniele Lorenzini, “The Emergence of Desire: Notes Toward a 
Political History of the Will,” Critical Inquiry 45 (2019); Daniele Lorenzini, “La politique du paradis. Foucault, 
Les Aveux de la chair et la généalogie du néolibéralisme,” in Après Les Aveux de la chair. Généalogie du sujet 
chez Michel Foucault, ed. Boehringer Sandra & Laufer Laurie (2020), 249-261. 
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reestablish.26 With Confessions of the Flesh, it is finally possible to see Foucault’s full critical 
project and, now, to give it life. 
I. A NOVEL LEGAL THEORY 
Let us begin here by framing Foucault’s critical project, as evidenced in the newly pub-
lished Volume 4, and tracing the continuities and differences. What will become apparent 
is that Confessions of the Flesh articulates a novel legal theory. 
A. Continuities 
The fourth and final volume of The History of Sexuality prolongs Foucault’s meticulous, 
painstaking archival project to analyze and expose the manner in which social, cultural, 
religious, and ethical practices have shaped humans during different historical periods. 
The volume completes, chronologically, the second and third volumes, pushing the anal-
ysis from Greek antiquity and the early Common Era philosophers to the early Christian 
thinkers of the first to fifth centuries. Foucault’s archive, in this fourth volume, is the dis-
course of those early Church scholars and ascetics, or what are called the early Christian 
fathers, from early Greek thinkers such as Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215), Origen (c. 
184-253), and John Chrysostom (c. 349-407), to the early Latin fathers such as Tertullian (c. 
155-222), Ambrose (c. 337-397), and John Cassian (c. 360-435), through the great Church 
father, Saint Augustine (354-430). 
We are all familiar, by now, with the broad stroke of his analysis: whereas the ancient 
Greeks (circa the fifth and fourth centuries BCE) understood sexual relations primarily 
through the framework of aphrodisia, a philosophical understanding that focused on the 
idea of an ethical self-mastery intended to prevent the subject from getting consumed by 
the pleasures of sexual relations (Volume 2, L’usage des plaisirs, The Use of Pleasures)27; 
whereas the Greek and Roman philosophers of the early Common Era (circa the first two 
centuries CE), especially the Stoics, conceptualized sexual relations primarily through the 
techniques of the self, such as the examination of conscience, the memorization of rules of 
austerity, and practices of penitence (Volume 3, Le Souci de soi, The Care of the Self)28; and 
by contrast to us moderns, who invented psychoanalytic, medical, and legal frameworks 
to regulate our sexuality (Volume 1, La Volonté de savoir, The Will to Know)29; the early 
 
26 This is the challenge posed today when digital subjects expose and implicate themselves daily in the con-
struction of our new expository society in the digital age, or get enmeshed in the counter-insurgency warfare 
paradigm of governing post 9/11. Daniele Lorenzini explores this as well in his chapter, “La politique du 
paradis. Foucault, Les Aveux de la chair et la généalogie du néolibéralisme” (2020).  
27 Foucault, L’usage des plaisirs; The Use of Pleasure. See also Lorenzini, “The Emergence of Desire,” 453; Stuart 
Elden, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh,” Theory, Culture & Society March 20 (2018) (describing the 
transition from aphrodisia to flesh to sexuality); Lynne Huffer, Foucault’s Strange Eros (2020).  
28 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 3. Le Souci de soi (1984); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 
3: The Care of the Self (1988). 
29 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 1. La Volonté de savoir (1976); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 
vol. 1: An Introduction (1990). 
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Christian thinkers deployed the framework of lust, flesh, and sin as a way to curb and 
regulate sexual relations. Stuart Elden, Daniele Lorenzini, Nancy Luxon, Sverre Raffnsøe, 
Joseph Tanke and others have laid this out elegantly in important reviews of the fourth 
volume.30 
But—and this is one of the surprising discoveries in Confessions of the Flesh—the patris-
tic tradition was far closer to the Greeks than had previously been imagined. The relation 
of the fathers to the ancients is far more continuous than it is to the moderns. Pace Nie-
tzsche, Foucault dispels the idea that Christianity radically transformed the relation to sex 
or invented the suspicion of pleasure.31 In most respects, he proposes, it drew on the ear-
lier writings and merely reframed the precepts of Stoic or pagan ethics. So, referring to 
the ancient Greek framework of aphrodisia, Foucault notes on the very first page of what 
might have been the first chapter: “One finds this same regime, essentially unmodified, 
in the doctrine of the second-century Fathers…These principles would have migrated, as 
it were, into Christian thought and practice, from pagan milieus…”.32 Or, referring to the 
first text analyzed, Paedagogus of Clement of Alexandria, written at the end of the second 
century CE, Foucault underscores “a great continuity with the texts of pagan philosophy 
and morality of the same epoch, or the period immediately preceding.”33 Throughout Vol-
ume 4, Foucault stresses first the continuity, before then refining the analysis to uncover 
the subtle transformations.  
B. Difference 
In the course of presenting the continuities and subtle shifts, there is one transformation 
that eclipses all others. It is the emergence of the subject of rights and responsibilities in 
Augustine’s writings. It is the juridical turn in Augustine that would prefigure modernity. 
As Foucault explains: 
 
30 Elden, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh,” Theory, Culture & Society March 20 (2018); Alexandre 
Gefen, Critical Inquiry 22 August (2018); Lorenzini, “The Emergence of Desire”; Nancy Luxon, “Review: Les 
Aveux de la chair,” Contemporary Political Theory 19:S3 (2020), S192-S196; Sverre Raffnsøe, “Review: Foucault’s 
Confessions of the Flesh,” Foucault Studies No. 25 (2018), 393-421; Joseph Tanke, “The Final ‘Final Foucault’?” 
Los Angeles Review of Books, August 1 (2018). 
31 As Lorenzini notes, the foil here is Nietzsche. Foucault’s history of the subject of desire, he writes, “ques-
tions Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim that ‘it was Christianity with its fundamental ressentiment against life that 
first made sexuality into something unclean.’” Daniele Lorenzini, “The Emergence of Desire: Notes Toward 
a Political History of the Will,” Critical Inquiry 45, 452 (quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or 
How to Philosophize with a Hammer, in “The Anti-Christ,” “Ecce Homo,” “Twilight of the Idols,” and Other Writings 
(2005), 228. See also Raffnsøe, “Review: Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh,” Foucault Studies No. 25 (2018), 400. 
Although Nietzsche is more absent in Volume 4 than he is in earlier work, it is nevertheless interesting to 
think of the place of Nietzsche in this genealogy of the desiring subject and of the modern subject of law. As 
François Ewald reminded me, the definition of the subject of law through the concept of responsibility is 
present in Nietzsche, in the second essay to the Genealogy of Morals, which rests as well on the historians of 
Roman law, especially on their work regarding the birth of the subject capable of contracting; so Nietzsche 
casts a shadow over this final volume as well.  
32 Foucault, Confessions of the Flesh, 3. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
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The effects and consequences of the Augustinian theory of concupiscence have obvi-
ously been considerable. I would just like to underscore an aspect of it that concerns the 
government of souls and the sexual conduct of spouses in particular. This government 
involved their “juridification” or rather the insertion of elements that would have given 
a juridical type of formalization to practices, rules, prescriptions, and recommendations 
that had previously been reflected primarily in the forms of spiritual asceticism and the 
techniques of purification of the soul.34  
In this respect, Confessions of the Flesh sets forth a unique theory of law: legal norms are 
not imposed on humans by lawmakers or on high. No, by contrast to theories of law that 
imagine the imposition of legal norms, Foucault proposes that humans have to be shaped 
into rights-bearing subjects first, and that this work is performed in the ethical and moral 
sphere of the regulation of social relations. This process of anterior subject creation, Fou-
cault traces primarily to Augustine: it is in Augustine’s introduction of the notion of con-
sensus, of consent, into the framework of lust in the context of marriage and marital sex, 
Foucault argues, that subjects begin to be thought as capable of being responsibilized and 
responsibilizable subjects—as subjects who can be assigned responsibility and culpability 
for their sexual acts through a process of self-examination of one’s relation to God. In 
effect, the notion of consent that emerges in Augustine is the condition of possibility of think-
ing of ourselves as subjects of rights within a juridical framework not only within but also 
beyond the domain of sexual relations.  
It is here that Confessions of the Flesh differs from the other set of lectures that treat the 
same archive, the 1981 Louvain lectures, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of 
Avowal in Justice. But the difference is telling. The distinction helps us close in on the 
unique contribution of Volume 4.   
To be sure, the series that now constitutes The History of Sexuality practically parallels, 
in its breadth and scope, Foucault’s lectures at Louvain, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The 
role of avowal in Volume 4 echoes the centrality of avowal at Louvain. The breadth of 
history, now, with the final three volumes, comes close to that of the Louvain lectures. 
Both texts are centrally about law. Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling focused on the relation be-
tween veridiction (telling truth, the diction of veritas) and juridiction (declaring justice, the 
diction of juris). Confessions of the Flesh is centrally about law as well, as evidenced by the 
very last and weighty sentence: “In this analytic [the analytic of the subject of concupis-
cence], sex, truth, and law are bundled together, by ties that our culture has tended to draw closer 
rather than loosen.”35  
But the differences between the two are worth noting because they reveal different the-
ories of law and the unique contribution of Volume 4. Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling studied 
the avowal in order to see how the subject implicates himself in his own subjugation. In 
those lectures, the focus is on the relation between avowal and social order. It is on how 
the subject implicates himself when he tells truth in processes that produce social order: 
How, for instance, Antilochus implicates himself in the construction of the social 
 
34 Ibid., 276-277. 
35 Ibid., 285. 
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hierarchy of ancient Greece through his quasi-avowal to Menelaus. In Confessions of the 
Flesh, of course, the analysis also focuses on how the discourse of flesh and lust produces 
a truth about oneself. In this sense, The History of Sexuality is also about sexual avowal and 
truth. That was, recall, the original intended title of the series: Sexe et vérité. But in Confes-
sions of the Flesh, another key dimension is the relation to law and juridification; not just 
in the sense of Wrong-Doing, the relation between veridiction and juridiction, but in the 
sense of the emergence of a modern legal subject. So what Confessions of the Flesh offers, in 
addition to Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, is the genealogy of the rights-bearing individual 
that is the foil to neoliberal thought. It thus offers the groundwork for Foucault’s critique 
of neoliberalism. 
C. The Subject of Law 
Foucault’s point is not that legal proscriptions emerge only in early Christian thought. 
Nor that a juridical framework first arises there. Of course not. That would be preposter-
ous. There was the Book of Deuteronomy in the Old Testament. There were proscriptions 
on adultery and sodomy throughout the Jewish Torah. “Let him who is without sin cast 
the first stone”: surely, under Hebraic law, there was already a conception of rights and 
duties, and of law, in the context of sexual relations. Foucault himself references through-
out Confessions of the Flesh, in his words, a “classic” codification36 that includes “the same 
prohibitions (adultery, debauchery, defilement of children, relations between men), and 
the same obligations (having procreation in mind when one marries and when one has 
sexual relations), with the same references to nature and its lessons.”37 Similarly, there are 
mentions of “law” far earlier in time in the historical analysis in Confessions of the Flesh. 
Listen to the discussion of Clement of Alexandria (an early father of the end of the second 
century CE) in his treatise, Paedagogus. Foucault writes there that, as logos, “As the Word, 
it [the pedagogue] teaches God’s law; and the commandments it formulates are the uni-
versal and living reason.”38 There was law before and there is law in the early Christian 
fathers. There are also elements of will, of volonté. Read here too the continuation of the 
discussion of Clement: “in these right actions which are in keeping with the Logos, we 
must recognize a will united with God and with Christ.”39   
So Foucault’s argument, naturally, is not that Augustine’s discourse on lust, consent, 
and marriage created for the first time legal duties in the context of sexual relations. More-
over his claim also is not that legal prohibitions are what shaped us as subjects. Foucault 
had already been clear about this in L’usage des plaisirs: “c’est donner là comme solution la 
question elle-même ….”40 No, the continuous cycles of legal prohibitions do not explain how 
we were shaped. They are rather the product of it.  
 
36 Ibid., 33. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Foucault, L’usage des plaisirs, 16.  
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Rather, Foucault’s argument is that Augustine’s writings solidified and justified, and 
legitimated, the conception of humans as rights-and-responsibility-bearing subjects in the 
field of sexual relations and, through its expansion, across human experience. In other 
words, it is only through the continual expansion of the justifiability and legitimacy of 
thinking of humans as legal subjects—here, through the further juridification of the field 
of marital sexual practices—that the modern liberal subject of rights and responsibilities, 
and of possessive individualism, would emerge. The modern political theory of individ-
ualism—from the Lockean notion of individual rights, through MacPherson’s theory of 
possessive individualism, to Gary Becker’s conception of human capital—depends on and 
derives from this expansion of the legitimate field of the juridical. Augustine is just one 
phase in this genealogy and evolution, but a pivotal one because of the emerging central-
ity of consent in sexual relations.  
D. The Main Thread of Volume 4 
The overarching project of Confessions of the Flesh is to show that, although early Christian 
thought had significant continuities with Stoic practices, and although there were some 
differences regarding, for instance, the severity of the regulations,41 those differences pale 
in comparison to the more important point that Christian thought shaped differently our 
relation to ourselves. The penitential discipline of the second half of the second century 
CE and the monastic ascetic practices of the end of the third century CE create a whole 
new relation toward the self and between wrong-doing and truth. There is a striking par-
allel to Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, which Foucault emphasizes in the opening pages of 
the fourth volume:  
The practice of penance and the exercises of the ascetic life organize relations between 
“wrong-doing” and “truth-telling”; they bundle together relations to oneself, to evil and 
to truth, in a way that it is doubtless much more innovative and much more determinant 
than this or that degree of severity added or subtracted from the code.42  
Foucault argues that the patristic tradition formed the subject around the notion of “flesh” 
as a mode of experience, as a mode of knowing oneself, as a way of achieving truth. It is 
a new mode of subjectivation: in a telling passage struck by Foucault, he writes, “The flesh 
is a mode of subjectification.”43 In this sense, baptism represents, for Foucault, the creation 
of what he calls “a certain relation between a nullification of evil and manifestation of 
truth”44 and which he describes meticulously in the second part of Chapter 1, developing 
 
41 Foucault, Confessions of the Flesh, 34-36.  
42 Ibid., 35; Foucault develops these themes of “dire vrai” throughout the first chapter, referring, for instance, 
to the avowal in medieval penitence as a form of truth-telling, by contrast to the early Christian penitence 
itself entirely constituting a truth-telling. Foucault, Confessions of the Flesh, 77-78.  
43 Confessions of the Flesh, 36 n.*. 
44 Ibid., 36 
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“the laborious baptism”45 and relying on the texts of Tertullian, especially De paenitentia.46 
It involves rituals of interrogatories, exorcisms (placing of the hands, blowing on the face), 
and confession or exomologesis that constitute a new mode of subject creation.47 
In early patristic thought, Foucault maintains, subjectivation takes place in novel ways. 
So, for instance, Foucault compares the Stoic examination of conscience, as reflected in 
Seneca’s essay On Anger,48 with the examinations of self in the writings of Clement, Hilary 
of Poitiers, or Ambrose, in order to demonstrate a shift. For Seneca, it is a question of 
reviewing one’s daily actions in order to remind oneself or program oneself to follow the 
proper rules of conduct and not to make the same mistakes again. By contrast, for Clement 
or Hilary, there is a different relation to the self that is mediated through God: “Here self-
knowledge is not in any way a spiritual examination, or a plunge into the depths of one-
self; it involves an ascent toward God, at the urging of a soul that is able to rise toward 
him.”49 And if we turn to the writings of John Cassian on early spiritual direction, we see 
another set of metaphors and pathways.50 Here, the Christian fathers speak of examining 
oneself as the miller or the money-changer might distinguish the good from the bad. The 
examination and direction are intended to weed good from bad thoughts and to test the 
purity of one’s thoughts; to determine whether the thoughts one is having are honest and 
faithful, or the product of deceit.51 The contrast between the approaches is sharp—and it 
is precisely the subtle transformations in the ways in which we speak truth about our-
selves, reveal our truths, manifest ourselves, and in the process shape our subjectivity, 
that Foucault unearths in their most minute details.  
But the main thread of the book concerns, within that broader arc, the emergence of the 
modern subject of law. At every step of the analysis in Confessions of the Flesh, Foucault 
 
45 Ibid., 37-57. 
46 See Foucault, Confessions of the Flesh, 41 et seq. 
47 Confessions of the Flesh, 49-53. 
48 See Confessions of the Flesh, 82-84. Foucault had developed this analysis of the examination of conscience in 
Michel Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, ed. Fabienne Brion and Bernard 
E. Harcourt (2014), 97-103; as well as The Government of the Living, 241 (“’When the light is lowered and my 
[partner], familiar with my habit, has become silent, I examine with myself my whole day […] and I take the 
measure again of my words and deeds, I measure them anew. […] I leave nothing out. […]’ Thus, in that 
discussion, Seneca says, ‘you spoke too aggressively, you reproached someone with too little reserve and 
you did not correct him. On the contrary, instead of correcting him, you offended him. See to it that in the 
future what you say is not only true, but that the person whom you speak can bear the truth you tell him.’” 
49 Confessions of the Flesh, 85; see also Foucault, The Government of the Living, 253 (“One knows oneself so that 
one can have access to knowledge of God, that is to say so that one can recognize what is divine in oneself, 
so that one can recognize the part or element in the soul that is of divine form, principle, origin, or at any 
rate in contact with God.”) 
50 Confessions of the Flesh, 102-105. 
51 Ibid., 103-104; see also Foucault, The Government of the Living, 301 (“What in fact does the money-changer 
do?” Foucault asks. “Cassian says the money-changer is someone who checks the metal of the coin, who 
checks its nature, its purity, and also the image stamped on it, someone who questions the coin’s origin. […] 
[First possibility: an idea comes to mind with all the brilliance of philosophical language], one thinks it pure 
gold—and God knows how philosophers can gild their ideas—but they are only the ideas of philosophers 
and not truly Christian. So they must be rejected. False metal.”)  
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carefully lays the groundwork for the argument that Augustine alone juridified sexual 
relations. At every stage, Foucault makes sure to lay a foundation for his thesis—which 
reflects the centrality of that intervention. At every step of the way before he gets to Au-
gustine, Foucault underscores that, even if there were earlier elements that resembled the 
juridical, they were not central, and that the subject of law only emerges with Augustine.  
1. The Juridical Is Only a Minor Dimension of the Penitential 
So, to begin with, Foucault analyses the rise of penitence in the second century CE (fully 
detailed in section III of Chapter 1) and emphasizes that, although there is a juridical di-
mension to the new penitential practices, that juridical dimension is not central. Foucault 
notes that there are certainly medical and juridical dimensions to penitence. Medical, in 
the sense that the model is often that of injuries and remedies, of the sick and the healer, 
with the priest taking the role of the doctor.52 Juridical, in the sense that the model is also 
often of the wrongdoer and the jury, taking place in the tribunal of truth, with the priest 
as judge.53  But despite this, and the fact that both the medical and the juridical models 
will increase in importance later with the penitential avowal (exagoreusis), Foucault main-
tains that they only have an “accessory role.”54 What is really determinative is the model 
of martyrdom, because it is more connected to the conduct of truth, Foucault states.55 Fou-
cault goes out of his way to stress that, in penitential practices, the juridical element that 
is there is of no importance, and that there is no creation of a subject of law.  
2. Juridical Not a Part of the Monastic 
Foucault then provides a lengthy discussion of monastic obedience, reading John Cassian 
who described intimately the rules of monastic life.56 But here too, it is not a juridical 
model but rather one of absolute submission. The permanent examination and confession 
of the self as well—what is called exagoreusis—is not modeled on the juridical for Fou-
cault.57 In fact, Foucault specifically emphasizes that it is not modeled on a juridical con-
fession.58 “Exagoreusis is not like an admission in court. It does not take place within an 
apparatus of juridiction; it is not a way for someone who has violated a law to recognize 
his responsibility in order to lessen the punishment.”59  
 
52 Confessions of the Flesh, 75. 
53 Ibid., 76. 
54 Ibid., 76. 
55 Ibid., 76-77. 
56 Ibid., 90 et seq. 
57 Ibid., 100 et seq. 
58 Ibid., 109-110. 
59 Ibid., 109. 
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3. Not a Part of the Regulation of Virginity 
The unique practice of virginity in Christianity—which both continued, but differed from, 
the pagan practices of continence—has a productive dimension, namely it contributes to 
the unique way of being that characterizes the Christian ethos: a special relationship “of 
the individual to himself, his thought, his soul, and his body.”60 By contrast to ancient 
Greek notions of continence and abstinence that are merely repressive, the idea of chastity 
is a positive force that gives rise to the concepts of the soul and body, and relations to 
self.61  
But the techniques of self-care associated with virginity do not amount to a law, Fou-
cault stresses. It is not regulated as law; other features are more important. “It is not a 
law,” Foucault affirms.62 It does not form a proscription. Foucault writes: 
It is a mode of relation between God and man; it marks that moment in the history of 
the world and in the movement of salvation where God and his creature no longer com-
municate through the Law and obedience to Law. […] It is an exercise of the soul upon 
itself, which carries it as far as the immortalization of the body. It is a relation of the soul 
to itself in which the unending life of the body is at stake.63 
Elsewhere, Foucault simply writes of virginity: “A choice, and not a law.”64 Once again, 
we are not yet at the juridification of sexual relations.  
Foucault develops the productivity of virginity at pages 154-155 of Confessions of the 
Flesh, where it becomes clear that, as a form of relation to the body—one that involves 
infinite labor (and the concept of labor and of the laboriousness of these practices is 
key)65—these practices ground the importance of sex in Western life. “The central place of 
sex in Western subjectivity is clearly marked by the formation of this mystique of virgin-
ity.”66 Foucault elaborates, at pages 188-89, on the productivity of virginity, on the sur-
veillance that it produces and the mode of subjectivation: it is the opening of a new do-
main, he argues, not repression. But here to, he emphasizes, it is not juridical. 
4. Marriage: Consent at the Source of the Subject of Law 
Foucault begins his analysis of what he calls “the arts of matrimonial life” at the end of 
the fourth century CE proposing a similar theoretical structure of similarities and differ-
ences—with the major difference here being that sexual relations between husband and 
wife are no longer viewed as primarily important for purposes of procreation.67 With 
Christianity, it is as if a whole new panel of a triptych opens up: marital sexual relations 
 
60 Ibid., 116. 
61 Ibid., 167. 
62 Ibid., 134. 
63 Ibid., 134. 
64 Ibid., 143.  
65 Ibid., 154, 37. 
66 Ibid., 155. 
67 Ibid., 197. 
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are not valued simply to have children but to calm lust and avoid the sins of fornication.68 
In effect, marriage is not just for procreation but for the enjoyment of consensual sex that 
is not blameworthy.69  
But even here, in this pre-Augustinian moment, Foucault makes sure to emphasize that 
the juridical element associated with marriage at that time—in creating obligations and in 
being itself “a law”70—is not primordial and that what still takes precedence is the rela-
tionship to oneself.71 The paradigm remains the relation of self to self. As he explains 
Even in the dual form of marriage, the basic problem is what to do with one’s own con-
cupiscence; hence it is the relation of oneself to oneself. And the internal law of marital 
sex was first organized as a way of managing through the other this fundamental self-
to-self relation.72 
It is only with Augustine that there emerges, first, the notion of pacts or contracts,73 and 
then a jurisprudence of sexual relations that, Foucault claims, will take considerable im-
portance in the second half of the Middle Ages and into the eighteenth century.74 Through 
notions of consent, free will, and lack of culpability, Augustine transforms the earlier lines 
of demarcation and effectively constructs a juridical model.75 Foucault explains: 
In centering his analysis of concupiscence not on the problem of the pure and the im-
pure, of the soul and the body, of matter and spirit, of passion and self-control, but on 
that of the voluntary and the involuntary, or more exactly on the very structure of the 
will, it is clear that he was inscribing it in a system of juridical references. He undertook 
the task […]: positing the sinner as a subject of law; or, as we would say in other vocab-
ulary, positing the subject of desire and the subject of law as existing simultaneously 
and in a single form. The two most important notions, no doubt, for this juridification 
were those of consent (consensus) and usage (usus).76    
This is precisely the passage that gives rise to a juridico-physical relationship between the 
subject of lust and the subject of law—and the emergence of this figure of the rights-and-
responsibilities-bearing individual who will play such an important role in the religious 
and political theories for so many centuries, through and beyond the Reformation.77 The 
central idea here is of an intertwining of the juridical and the physical, of the institutional 
 
68Ibid., 209. 
69 Ibid., 209-210; see also Nancy Luxon, “Review: Les Aveux de la chair,” Contemporary Political Theory 19:S3 
(2020), S194 (noting that Les Aveux de la chair “opens up (for a readerly audience if not those of early Christi-
anity) the space of a spiritual subject not yet soldered to a juridical one – a claim radical in its time, but now 
more familiar from the intervening years of speculation.”) 
70 Confessions of the Flesh, 213. 
71 Ibid., 220. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 244. 
74 Ibid., 253. 
75 Ibid., 259. 
76 Ibid., 277. 
77 Ibid., 276-277 (Foucault extends this period to the Reformation), 280 (discussion of the “juridico-physical”). 
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and of the corporeal. As Foucault provocatively writes: “one made use of a right in mak-
ing use of a body.”78  
II. FOUCAULT’S CRITIQUE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
Confessions of the Flesh thus provides the missing genealogical link to the rights-and-re-
sponsibility-bearing modern legal subject who represents the foil to the neoliberal eco-
nomic subject. And Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism hinges on that distinction.  
As Foucault made clear in his lectures in 1979 on The Birth of Biopolitics, the central actor 
of neoclassical economic thought and of neoliberal practice, homo œconomicus, can only be 
understood properly in contradistinction to the modern subject of law.79 Foucault traces 
the emergence of the economic subject back to the writings of English empiricist philoso-
phy from Locke onwards: the appearance of what he calls “a subject of interest,” and 
which he defines as “a subject as the source of interest, the starting point of an interest, or 
the site of a mechanism of interests.”80 He distinguishes this emerging subject of interest 
from the modern legal subject of, say, Blackstone, and shows how it develops eventually 
into the subject of laissez-faire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, into the subject 
of rational choice in the twentieth century, and into the neoliberal subject at the end of the 
twentieth century. This economic subject is directly contrasted with the subject of lust and 
the subject of law who emerges in the final pages of Confessions of the Flesh. The foil ani-
mates Foucault’s argument. As he writes in 1979: 
[…] the theory of the subject in English empiricism probably represents one of the most 
important mutations, one of the most important theoretical transformations in Western 
thought since the Middle Ages.  
What English empiricism introduces—let’s say, roughly, with Locke—and doubtless for 
the first time in Western philosophy, is a subject who is not so much defined by his freedom, 
or by the opposition of soul and body, or by the presence of a source or core of concupiscence 
marked to a greater or lesser degree by the Fall or sin, but who appears in the form of a subject 
of individual choices which are both irreducible and non-transferrable.81 
It is on the basis of that distinction that Foucault identifies the logic of neoliberal thought: 
What is so powerful about classical liberalism and reinforced in neoliberalism is that, by 
contrast to the subject of rights who can limit the power of the state, the idea of the eco-
nomic subject strips the state of all knowledge. It completely disarms the state. In this 
sense, the theory of homo œconomicus outdoes the theory of the subject of law and, in the 
process, strips the state and all collective authority of any and all legitimacy because they 
have no knowledge and no possibility of knowledge.  
 
78 Ibid., 280. 
79 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 295 (lecture of April 4, 1979). 
80 The Birth of Biopolitics, 273. 
81 Ibid., 271-272 (emphasis added). 
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Foucault’s central critique of neoliberalism can be located in his lecture of March 28, 
1979—I refer to it elsewhere as his “third critique” because there are two others in The 
Birth of Biopolitics.82 This third critique argues that the very ideal of a deregulated govern-
ment is baked into the cake of neoliberalism because of the underlying theory of the sub-
ject in the rational actor model. In other words, the political outcomes are inserted from 
the get-go and inscribed in the notion of the rational, self-interested subject that founds 
the very approach. The original theory of the self-interested and self-knowing subject, as-
sumed by these thinkers, automatically disqualifies the knowledge of the political sover-
eign or the collectivity.  
In other words, neoliberalism assumes from the outset a subject who alone is the know-
ing subject, and, as a result, there is no question that the political body must ultimately be 
disqualified. Foucault explains this in the following passage: 
Economic rationality is not only surrounded by, but founded on the unknowability of 
the totality of the process. Homo œconomicus is the one island of rationality possible 
within an economic process whose uncontrollable nature does not challenge, but in-
stead founds the rationality of the atomistic behavior of homo œconomicus.  Thus the eco-
nomic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable. […] Liberalism acquired 
its modern shape precisely with the formulation of this essential incompatibility be-
tween the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and the totalizing 
unity of the juridical sovereign. 
[…] Homo œconomicus … tells the sovereign: You must not. But why must he not? You 
must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that “you are powerless.” 
And why are you powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do not know, and 
you do not know because you cannot know. 
[…] The basic function or role of the theory of the invisible hand is to disqualify the 
political sovereign.83 
 
82 This central critique can be located on pages 282-283 of the English edition and pages 285-286 of the original 
French edition of The Birth of Biopolitics. I discuss the other two critiques in my essay on Foucault’s Birth of 
Biopolitics at Foucault 13/13 here: http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/foucault1313/2016/03/30/foucault-813-some-
questions-for-nancy-fraser-richard-brooks-and-kendall-thomas/.  
83 Birth of Biopolitics, 282-283; Naissance de la biopolitique, 285-286. This (third) critique can also be discerned in 
two other places.  First on page 271 of the English, page 275 of the French edition, when Foucault begins the 
discussion, rhetorically: 
Is homo œconomicus […] not already a certain type of subject who precisely enabled an art of govern-
ment to be determined according to the principle of economy, both in the sense of political economy 
and in the sense of the restriction, self-limitation, and frugality of government? 
Second, on page 292 on April 4, 1979, in the last lecture, where Foucault is discussing the fact that “Homo 
œconomicus strips the sovereign of power inasmuch as he reveals an essential, fundamental, and major inca-
pacity of the sovereign, that is to say, an inability to master the totality of the economic field. The sovereign 
cannot fail to be blind vis-a-vis the economic domain or field as a whole.” (Birth of Biopolitics, 292; Naissance 
de la biopolitique, 296).  
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In effect, the epistemological assumptions regarding the economic subject are entirely re-
sponsible for the theoretical outcomes: neoliberal economic theory rests on an illusion, an 
unfounded belief.  
I would argue that this critique of neoliberalism was confirmed during a seminar with 
Gary Becker and François Ewald at the University of Chicago in 2013, when Becker read 
and responded to Foucault’s discussion of his work. During the course of that seminar, 
when Becker was pushed on the empirical foundation for certain of his assertions, Becker 
spontaneously exclaimed that “I believe there’s a lot of risk of government overregulating 
society with too many laws, and that’s why I’ve always been a small government person.”84 
Becker returned to this statement a few moments later, and elaborated: 
It comes from a belief that the government usually makes things worse, rather than 
making them better, for the bulk of the population. It’s an analysis—it may be a wrong 
analysis, but that’s the analysis. […] When I say I’m a small government person, I am 
making the judgment that whatever the imperfection when the private sector operates, 
the effects are worse when I see the government operating. Now, other people may say 
that the evidence for that is not so clear, that in other sectors it is different. I recognize 
that. But that is what it would be based on.85 
That exchange with Becker instantiates Foucault’s critique. It lays bare the epistemological 
assumption underlying neoliberal thought—a bare, unfounded assumption—that itself 
produces the political outcomes favoring a purportedly limited government. (I say “pur-
portedly” because the neoliberal conception of a small government is joined at the hip by 
a massive domestic and international police state that serves to maintain the appearance 
of free markets.86) In any event, the subjectivity assumed by neoliberal theory animates 
the political outcomes. 
In thus completing the genealogy of the subject of concupiscence and the subject of 
law, Confessions of the Flesh provides the final building block necessary for the critique of 
Becker and American neoliberalism. Volume 4 demonstrates, in detail, how Augustine’s 
conception of consent in the context of marital sexual relations forms the final and for-
merly missing link in the chain: the modern legal subject.  
CONCLUSION 
In the public seminar at Columbia University Critique 13/13, we took on the challenge of 
returning to classical texts of critical theory to diagnose our contemporary crisis and 
 
84 See Gary S. Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard E. Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on Crime and Punish-
ment,” Carceral Notebooks, vol. 9: Neoliberalism (cont’d) (2013), 32 (emphasis added); see also generally Gary S. 
Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard E. Harcourt, “‘Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker’: American Ne-
oliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures,” Carceral Notebooks, vol. 7: Neoliberalism 
and Risk (2011). 
85 Becker, Ewald, and Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on Crime and Punishment,” Carceral Notebooks, vol. 9: 
Neoliberalism (cont’d), 37-38. 
86 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (2011). 
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reorient our political struggles.87 I would argue that the challenge with regard to Confes-
sions of the Flesh—as well as The Use of Pleasures and The Care of Self—is to fold the history 
of the desiring subject back into the overarching critical project, to integrate the work on 
subjectivity into the earlier theory of knowledge-power, in order to produce a more robust 
three-dimensional critique of the present. And then, perhaps even more importantly, to 
confront the full history of the present against our contemporary modes of critical praxis 
and resistance.  
More concretely, the challenge is to better understand how we, contemporary subjects, 
have been shaped, understand ourselves, experience and reproduce relations of power in 
this period of crisis marked by hegemonic neoliberal practice, new digital technologies, 
post-9/11 counterrevolution, global climate change, and pandemic; and how this interacts 
with and against our ongoing forms of resistance and revolt. In bridging the philosophical 
work on subject creation and the earlier critique of power, and placing Foucault’s critical 
project squarely under the tri-partite structure of knowledge-power-subjectivity, Confes-
sions of the Flesh offers one of the most promising models for a way forward. 
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